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NOTES 
NEw AND CoMPREHENSIVE DuTIES oF SECURITIES SELLERS To INVESTIGATE, 
DISCLOSE, AND HAVE AN "ADEQUATE BASIS" FOR REPRESENTATIONS 
The duties of investigation and disclosure imposed upon securities 
salesmen have been significantly enlarged by several recent cases generated 
by the Second Circuit's 1963 decision of Berko v. SEC.1 In a hearing before 
the Securities and Exchange Commission2 it was found that Berka was a 
salesman working out of an acknowledged "boiler room."8 His employer 
had provided its salesmen, including Berka, with fraudulent sales bro-
chures,4 some of which were subsequently distributed by Berko. The action 
by the Commission against Berko arose out of the sale of a specific security 
to a customer who had received fraudulent sales brochures and had called 
Berko to inquire about investment in the stock. In the course of this par-
ticular sale, Berko represented that there was a "good possibility" that the 
market value of the stock would, within a year, increase to fifteen from its 
sale price of seven. In finding this conduct to be a violation of the anti-
fraud provisions5 of the securities acts, the Commission had before it evi-
dence that the salesman had himself purchased a large amount of the stock 
and had sold varying amounts to his relatives as well as to others. In addi-
tion, the stock did, in fact, increase in value (albeit not within the pre-
dicted time),6 and there was uncontroverted testimony by the customer that 
he had understood Berko's prediction of increase in value to be only an 
opinion.1 On petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit remanded to the Commission,8 which affirmed its previous order with-
out further hearing, but with a revised opinion.9 In this reiterated order 
1 316 F.2d 137 (2d ed. 1963). 
2 Mac Robbins 8c Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6462, Feb. 6, 1961, 
supplemented, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6498, March 16, 1961. 
s The "boiler room" metaphor refers to the cacophony and perspiration produced 
by numbers of securities salesmen simultaneously delivering high-pressure sales pitches 
into rows of telephones. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 266 (1958). For dis-
cussions of boiler-room sales practices, see Report of Special Study of Securities Markets 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 
pt. I, at 265-68 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Special Study]; Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1411 (1963). 
4 Berko's employer stipulated for purposes of the hearing that the brochures were 
false and misleading. Mac Robbins 8c Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No, 6462, 
Feb. 6, 1961. 
5 Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1958); Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § IO(b), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958), and § 15(c)(l), 48 
Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(l) (1958); Rule IOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 24O.IOb-5 (1949); Rule 
15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1949). 
6 Mac Robbins 8c Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6462, Feb. 6, 1961. 
See also Brief for Petitioner, p. 4, Berko v. SEC, 297 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1961). 
7 Record, p. 139, Mac Robbins 8c Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6462, 
Feb. 6, 1961. 
8 Berko v. SEC, 297 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1961). "Basically • • • [the Commission's) 
goal should be clarification of the legal duties imposed on salesmen involved in • • • 
[boiler room] operations •••• " Id. at 119. 
9 Mac Robbins 8c Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962, 
aff d, Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963). 
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finding Berko a "cause"10 of revocation of his employer's broker-dealer 
registration, the Commission emphasized that its findings were not based 
on any value judgment as to the qualities of the stock involved, and that 
the customer's understanding as to Berko's representations had no signifi-
cance insofar as the gravamen of the salesman's offense was concemed.11 
Rather, Berko's breach of duty, in the first instance, consisted of his failure 
to have an "adequate basis" for his statements as to future increases in the 
market value of the stock.12 The court of appeals affirmed this holding 
and, further, affirmed the Commission's additional holding that a salesman 
working out of a boiler room is to be held to a higher duty of independent 
investigation and disclosure than a salesman in a legitimate securities sales 
operation, and that a boiler-room salesman's conduct is fraudulent if the 
information he presents to the public to induce sales is misleading.13 On 
this latter ground, the Commission, and the court of appeals on review, re-
jected as a defense the salesman's contention that he was justified in relying 
on the fraudulent brochures prepared by his employer.14 
In one sense, it may be said that the Berka decision is simply judicial 
recognition of previously delineated Commission policy. This policy is 
based on considerations affecting the application of the federal securities 
acts-in particular the anti-fraud provisions-to the boiler-room sales op-
eration. The federal securities laws are the result of congressional awareness 
that securities are complex merchandise, and that intelligent investment 
decisions require evaluation of detailed information concerning the se-
curity involved.111 One of the primary efforts of the Commission to effectuate 
these laws has been the imposition of a standard of professionalism upon the 
securities business.16 This standard frequently has been characterized by 
the Commission as an implied representation of fair dealing between the 
broker-dealer, or his salesman, and the customer.17 Consequently, the anti-
fraud provisions have been construed to proscribe a variety of selling prac-
10 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b) and § 15A(b)(4), 49 Stat. 1378 (1936) and 
52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1958) and 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(4) 
(1958), provide for revocation of a broker or dealer's registration if any person employed 
by a registered broker-dealer has willfully violated any provision of the securities acts, 
and § 15A(b)(4) further provides for revocation if an employee previously has been 
found a "cause" of a revocation. As interpreted by the Commission and the courts, 
"cause" is a term of art and need not be an immediate or inducing cause. R. H. Johnson 
&: Co., 33 S.E.C. 180, afj'd sub nom. R. H. Johnson &: Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 855 (1952). 
11 Mac Robbins &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962. 
12 Ibid. The Commission found not only that the sales literature was fraudulent, 
but also that financial information contradicting the misrepresentations in the brochures 
had been prepared and was readily available. 
13 Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1963). 
14 Ibid. 
111 Mac Robbins &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962. 
16 See generally Spedal Study pt. 1, at 237-40; Comment, 62 MICH. L. REv. 680, 734 
(1964). 
17 See, e.g., Charles Hughes &: Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 
U.S. 786 (1943); Duker&: Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939). 
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tices other than misstatement of, or omission to state, a material fact.ls 
Common-law concepts of fraud and deceit-requiring proof of false rep-
resentation of a material fact, scienter, and frequently reliancelo_have 
been greatly expanded by the Commission.20 Apparently, the aim is to pro-
hibit as fraudulent conduct any activity which exploits or encourages in-
equalities of bargaining power or capability. The additional duty thus im-
posed is couched in terms of an implied standard of fair dealing, but can 
be generically defined as a duty of disclosure incumbent on the seller when-
ever failure to disclose information is disadvantageous to a customer's in-
formed and careful consideration of the investment factors applicable to 
the security involved. 
The so-called boiler room, because of the nature of the selling tech-
niques involved, presents a formidable challenge to effective regulation of 
securities sales practices. Typical boiler-room practices include the dis-
tribution of glamorous sales literature, usually describing an unlisted se-
curity, followed by high pressure long-distance telephone calls from the 
salesman reiterating the glowing picture of growth and quick profits pre-
sented in the literature. The purpose is immediate sale, and factors which 
tend to cast doubt on the predicted success of an investment are played 
down, or often omitted entirely.21 The Commission itself has characterized 
the boiler-room operation as "the antithesis of fair dealing."22 Nevertheless, 
such selling practices have not yet been held a per se violation of the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities acts.23 As a result, Commission efforts to 
eradicate boiler-room practices necessarily have been directed to specific 
conduct which does come within the scope of the anti-fraud provisions. 
These attempts to curb sales abuses in the boiler-room context have taken 
one of two forms. First, outright false statements are expressly proscribed 
by the anti-fraud provisions24 and, when provable,25 are a sufficient basis 
18 See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, supra note 17; Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795 
(8th Cir. 1943). The anti-fraud provisions, supra note 5, are broader in coverage than 
common-law definitions of fraud. Their composite effect, as applicable here, makes 
unlawful use of the mails or interstate facilities in connection with the offer or sale 
of any security where there is present a device to defraud, an untrue or misleading 
statement of a material fact, omission to state such fact so as to be misleading, or 
any act, practice, or course of conduct which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon a customer. 
19 See Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 374 (1889). 
20 For a comparison of securities fraud concepts and common-law deceit, see 3 Loss, 
SECURITIES REGULATION 1430-44 (2d ed. 1961). 
21 See authorities cited in note 30 supra. 
22 Mac Robbins & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962. 
It has even been suggested that "firms which qualify for this ignominious appellation, 
almost without exception, operate in violation of existing legal and ethical standards.'' 
Special Study pt. 1, at 265. 
23 But cf. proposed Rule 15c2-6, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6885, 
Aug. 16, 1962. This rule would make it unlawful for a broker or dealer to sell or 
offer certain equity securities at a price of $10 or less by telephone unless he estab• 
lishes that the transaction is exempt under the rule. 
24 See note 18 supra. 
25 Cf. text accompanying note 3 infra. 
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for Commission action. As a second ground, the Commission has adopted 
the position that representations made to a prospective customer without 
an adequate basis are contrary to the basic obligation of fair dealing and 
therefore also constitute fraud.26 It is immaterial to such a determination 
that representations are couched in terms of opinion, rather than fact, so 
long as the representations are designed to induce purchases.27 As is sug-
gested by the number of cases in which the Commission has employed the 
"adequate basis" test as a standard for finding representations to be fraudu-
lent, the test is not a new one.28 Berko v. SEC, however, was the first judicial 
affirmation of this duty. The duty is based on the fair dealing standard 
previously mentioned and presumably provides the salesman with a choice 
of either having reasonable substantiation for oral representations made to 
the customer or else refraining entirely from predictions concerning the 
security. It appears that, if the salesman desires to make predictions, he 
must investigate and compare all available information, and such informa-
tion must provide an adequate basis for his prediction. On the other hand, 
failure to investigate is not itself fraudulent conduct under this standard, 
nor need the salesman disclose the basis for his representation to the cus-
tomer. It is only in after-the-fact examination of such a representation that 
the salesman must be able to show his statement concerning the security to 
have been reasonable in light of all the information reasonably available 
at the time of sale. Thus, at least ostensibly, investigation in the "adequate 
basis" obligation of the salesman involves no affirmative duty of investiga-
tion.29 
Neither of the two foregoing methods of control is sufficient protection 
against the totality of abuse usually present in the boiler-room operation. 
The essence of boiler-room technique is the presentation of a composite mis-
representation by means of a series of omissions and distortions, none of 
which is itself clearly fraudulent. Consequently, it is often infeasible, be-
cause of the time and expense involved, to prove specific selling violations, 
and fraudulent conduct may not be provable at all. Moreover, even in situ-
ations where there have been fraudulent oral representations, serious prob-
lems of proving that a specific salesman perpetrated a particular fraud arise 
20 See, e.g., Alexander Reid & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727, 
Feb. 8, 1962; Barnett & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6310, July 5, 1960; 
Best Sec. Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6282, June 3, 1960; Leonard 
Burton Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5978, June 4, 1959. 
27 See cases cited in note 26 supra. 
28 Although the test has been frequently used, it is, nevertheless, a fairly recent 
one, having been apparently first employed to determine the presence of fraudulent 
conduct in 1959. Leonard Burton Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5978, 
June 4, 1959. 
20 The Commission logically could have expanded the duty to have an adequate 
basis to include a responsibility for the accuracy of any literature the salesman dis-
tributes-requiring investigation before sale to avoid violation of the anti-fraud provi-
sions if such literature is false-but it has not done so. The duty appears to be limited 
to oral representations. Cases cited in note 26 supra. 
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because the transaction has been conducted by long-distance telephone.so 
This mode of selling also impairs initial discovery of violations because 
there is no tangible evidence of infraction which the Commission might 
find in a periodic inpection of a firm's records, and because many defrauded 
customers, unaware that the representation is fraudulent, accept the loss 
as a risk of speculation or, out of pride, hesitate to complain that they have 
been duped. 31 
It is in this area of misconduct difficult of proof that the Berko decision 
is most significant. The court not only held that failure to have an adequate 
basis for representations made to the customer is fraud, but also, inde-
pendently, that the salesman has an affirmative duty to investigate informa-
tion presented to the public to induce sales. As a result of his knowledge 
that he was working in a boiler room, the salesman in Berko was put on 
notice of the potentiality of unethical securities sales practices and there-
fore had constructive knowledge of the fraudulence of the contents of his 
employer's sales brochures.32 Charged with this knowledge, the salesman's 
continued participation in the boiler-room operation constituted willful 
violation of the anti-fraud provisions, since he was responsible for allowing 
customers to rely on the fraudulent brochures.33 The significance of this 
holding is twofold. First, a finding of fraud based on failure to investigate 
imposes a much higher standard than merely requiring restraint from rep-
resentation if the available facts do not warrant a prediction. Reliance on 
fraudulent information prepared by others will not exculpate the salesman; 
an affirmative duty to investigate personally the accuracy of information 
presented to the investing public is imposed. To avoid fraudulent conduct 
it is no longer sufficient that the salesman simply refrain from making pre-
dictions himself; he must also investigate other information upon which the 
customer may rely. Although the opinion in Berko v. SEC does not make 
clear the extent of the investigation required, it suggests, as a minimum, the 
examination of all available information concerning the security.34 Presum-
ably, the obligation requires either a full disclosure of deficiencies or in-
accuracies contained in the sales literature or else the salesman's immediate 
dissociation of himself from the sales campaign.35 The public interest in 
30 To prove fraud the Commission must not only ascertain what was communicated, 
but also associate representations made by voice over the long-distance telephone to the 
salesman and assemble some evidence concerning the issuer in order to make a showing 
as to the false or misleading character of the representation. Loomis, Enforcement 
Problems Under the Federal Securities Laws, 14 Bus. LA.w. 665, 673 (1959). 
31 See Special Study pt. 1, at 304-08. 
32 Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1963). 
33 Ibid. The gravamen of the violation thus appears to be the failure of the sales-
man to disabuse the customer of the misleading information upon which the latter 
might rely in deciding to purchase. 
34 See note 12 supra. 
35 Cf. Cady, Roberts &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, Nov. 8, 
1961, where the Commission held that, if disclosure required of a corporate insider 
would be improper or unrealistic under the circumstances, the alternative must be to 
forego the transaction. 
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such regulation surmounts objections that such a duty of investigation, 
accompanied by commensurate disclosure, amounts to advising a customer 
not to purchase,36 or that holding a boiler-room salesman responsible for 
literature prepared by his employer is tantamount to guilt by association.87 
As the Commission has suggested, there can be no justification for a claim 
of reliance on literature furnished by an employer who is engaged in a 
fraudulent sales campaign;3B the effect of allowing exculpation of the sales-
man under these circumstances would be to place a premium on indiffer• 
ence to responsibility at the point most directly and intimately affecting 
the investor. Second, the holding in Berko established a duty which may 
be breached even though a salesman claims reliance on misrepresentations 
contained in printed matter. Misrepresentation is not an element of· the 
salesman's fraud; therefore, evidence of fraudulent statements, made by the 
salesman at some indeterminate time in the past over the long distance tele-
phone, need not be produced. 
However, as with most definitions of duty established by the Commis-
sion,39 the ad hoc nature of the finding of violation raises at least two im-
portant and related questions: (1) the extent of investigation required and: 
(2) the situations in which the duty to investigate will be imposed. The 
first question is one of degree. For example, in the Berko case the salesman 
himself mailed out many of the fraudulent brochures and had ample op-
portunity to inspect them.40 Whether the salesman will also be held in 
violation if his employer disseminates the fraudulent literature is left un-
answered. Presumably, the salesman's conduct would be fraudulent in such 
a situation if the material is reasonably available to the salesman.41 If so, 
the question arises as to how much and what type of misrepresentation 
must appear in the sales literature to make it fraudulent.42 A policy of ad 
hoc determination, made necessary by the differences in fact situations in 
which selling malpractice may arise, considerably limits the specificity of 
any answer which may be given to the question of degree of investigation 
required. Some indication, however, is present in an answer to the second 
problem-that of the situations in which the affirmative duty to investigate 
will be imposed. The court in the Berko case predicated the duty of in-
vestigation and disclosure upon notice of the potentiality of fraudulent sales 
36 Cf. Mac Robbins &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6462, at 7, 
Feb. 6, 1961. 
37 Cf. Brief for Petitioner, p. 12, Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963). 
ss Mac Robbins &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962. 
30 See generally Comment, 62 MICH. L. REv. 680 (1964). 
40 See Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1963). 
41 Cf. text accompanying note 56 infra. 
42 The Commission found the brochures distributed by Berka fraudulent because 
they emphasized that the company was a well-financed, expertly-managed, profit-making 
enterprise when in fact the financing was questionable, the managers were inexperienced, 
and the so-called dividends constituted merely a fractionating of shareholder's existing 
equity interests. Mac Robbins &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, 
July 11, 1962. 
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practices imputed to the salesman because of his knowledge that he was 
involved in a high-pressure sales operation, a situation which, in the past 
experience of the Commission, had proved a fertile ground for security 
sales frauds.43 The court thus specifically limited its decision regarding the 
obligation of investigation to a boiler-room context44 and implied that the 
principle of law applied was even further limited by the Commission find-
ings of fact.45 However, subsequent to this decision, the obligation of in-
vestigation has been applied in holding securities sales practices fraudulent 
in at least three cases, only two of which involved boiler rooms and boiler-
room salesmen.46 
In the first of these, a civil action for damages,47 the facts were similar 
to those of the Berko case, although the high-pressure long-distance tele-
phone solicitation, following distribution of sales literature, was instigated 
by the salesman. The salesman claimed reliance on oral information re-
ceived from his employer as the basis for false predictions made to the 
plaintiff customer.48 No fraudulent sales literature was involved, but, in 
finding the salesman personally liable in damages for his customer's losses, 
the court held the salesman to the same duty of investigation imposed in 
Berko.49 In a second case,50 a criminal proceeding, the court also cited the 
Berko decision, and held that the salesman's conduct was criminally fraudu-
lent since he should have been aware both that a boiler room was in prog-
ress and that the sales literature involved "was suspicious on its face to 
anyone with the slightest financial knowledge."51 It is significant in eval-
uating the scope of the holding in Berko v. SEC that in neither of the above 
43 See Special Study pt. 1, at 265. 
44 Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1963). 
45 Id. at 143 n.6. In administrative actions by the Commission such as that reviewed 
in the Berka case, sanctions are preceded by findings of fact. Of the ten salesmen 
implicated in the boiler-room operation which gave rise to the Berka decision, nine 
were found to have engaged in fraudulent conduct. The tenth was found factually 
not to have violated the anti-fraud provisions. Ibid. On the other hand, while injunc-
tive actions by the Commission and criminal actions referred to the Attorney General 
are preceded by an investigation performed by the Commission's staff, there is no 
finding of fact by the Commission itself. Of course, such actions may result from facts 
ascertained in a formal hearing. See generally 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 20, at 1894-
1918, 1945-2004. 
46 Cf. Richmond Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4584, Feb. 27, 1960, wherein 
a duty of independent investigation of the issuer wa~ imposed on a broker-dealer acting 
as the underwriter. 
47 Herring v. Hendison, 218 F. Supp. 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
48 Id. at 420. 
49 The court stated that "if a salesman working in a 'boiler room' house claims 
that he relied on literature furnished by an employer who is engaged in a fraudulent 
sales campaign, that reliance does not excuse him.'' Ibid. The evidence in this case 
consisted almost entirely of the customer's testimony that the defendant was the sales-
man to whom he talked. Defendant denied this, but the court found that the testi-
mony had the "ring of truth in it." Ibid. 
50 United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894 (1963). 
51 Id. at 65. Defendant salesman's contention on appeal had been that there was 
insufficient evidence of violation of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 because he was 
warranted in relying on information given him by his employer. Ibid. 
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cases was the decision preceded by a Commission finding of fact, since the 
Commission is not a party to criminal proceedings or civil actions for dam-
ages under the securities acts. Both cases, however, dealt with the conduct 
of a salesman working out of a boiler room. 
The third case, SEC v. Chamberlain Associates,52 involved neither a 
boiler room nor a salesman as such, but a financial public relations con-
sultant hired to create a market for the stock.53 The court, ordering an in-
junction to issue against the defendant, relied on a conclusion of law that 
his conduct was fraudulent in violation of section 17(a) of the Securities 
Act. The evidence presented by the Commission in the action consisted, 
inter alia, of a showing that the defendant had distributed a letter con-
taining four false or misleading statements about certain mining stock.54 
The letter was designed as a report to shareholders, and had been distrib-
uted as such by defendant's employer. However, defendant had utilized the 
letter only to provide information for broker-dealers intended as a market 
for the stock, and he had had no contact with the public. With respect to 
the defendant's claim that his conduct was not fraudulent because he had 
simply relied on the representations of others, the court stated that it was 
by virtue of his representations that the stock would pass to the public, and 
that defendant therefore "had the duty to investigate further."55 In light of 
this decision, it is obvious that the Commission does not intend to limit the 
affirmative duty of investigation merely to the boiler-room context. A logi-
cal extension of the investigation requirement would be its application to 
situations in which the circumstances of a sale should charge an employee 
with knowledge that he is engaged in a fraudulent sales campaign, regard-
less of whether the operation is a boiler room or not. However, the Cham-
berlain case did not rest the finding of fraud upon any such knowledge 
attributable to the defendant. Rather, his duty was independent of any 
outside circumstances and arose because "the true facts were apparently 
readily available by mere correspondence with ... others."56 The result of 
this decision is imposition of the duty of affirmative investigation upon all 
persons in the securities business who are actively involved in sales efforts. 
Availability of facts contradictory to representations concerning managerial 
experience and financial status of the company the stock of which is to be 
sold is, at best, a minimal requirement upon which to rest a duty, since 
such information is usually in the public domain. And to suggest that the 
information need only be "apparently" readily available is to diminish 
further any limitation upon the duty of investigation. Moreover, it would 
appear that, even if correct information is not "readily available" and the 
52 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1J 91228 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1963). 
53 Id. at 94070. 
54 See note 45 supra. This evidence was apparently obtained through investigation 
rather than from a finding by the Commission. 
55 SEC v. Chamberlain Associates, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1J 91228, at 94070 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 16, 1963). 
66 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) 
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information disseminated is false or misleading, distribution still consti-
tutes a fraud, since investigation would disclose that there is no "adequate 
basis" for the representations. 57 
It cannot be doubted that the nature of the securities business requires 
some standard of fair dealing and concomitant disclosure by the seller. The 
broad scope of the anti-fraud provisions and the interpretation of them by 
the Commission and the courts clearly indicate that some standard of pro-
fessionalism is viewed as not only desirable, but mandatory. Within this 
framework, adequate protection of the investing public may well require 
the high duty imposed in the Berko case. However, the opinion leaves un-
defined not only the degree of investigation required (as well as more 
limited considerations as to what constitutes an "adequate basis"), but also 
the scope of the obligation in terms of when it is to arise. Some of the ob-
jection to the resulting uncertainty is obviated when the action is initially 
a proceeding before the Commission, since the Commission must find, even 
though the conduct is fraudulent, that the sanction to be imposed is in the 
"public interest.''58 This requirement circumscribes to some degree the 
harshness of ad hoc application of an undefined standard of conduct to se-
curities sales practices. Further protection against arbitrary application of 
the standard is provided by the nature of Commission proceedings-findings 
viewed against the broad background of the entire securities industry, with 
which the Commission is necessarily familiar. On the other hand, no such 
limitations upon liability exist when the proceeding is a criminal or civil 
action.59 Failure to investigate the accuracy of information disseminated 
to the public is a considerably broader concept of fraud than even previous 
Commission interpretations of the anti-fraud provisions. It is not subject to 
the prima fade elements of proof required in a common-law deceit action 
or a proceeding for criminal fr~ud. If a breach of the duty of investigation 
is to give rise to civil liabilities and criminal culpability, as well as Com-
mission sanctions, there should be definitional limitations circumscribing 
the raising of this duty. While the Berko case suggests imputed knowledge 
of the employer's fraudulent conduct as a limited circumstance giving rise 
to the duty, the Chamberlain holding indicates that the requirement is to 
encompass far more than imputed knowledge. If the obligation is to arise 
in all securities sales, it is definite and significant enough to be codified by 
legislation or regulation. On the other hand, if reliance by the employee 
upon information obtained from, or distributed by, his employer is fraudu-
57 But cf. note 29 supra and accompanying text. 
58 Under the anti-fraud provisions, supra note 5, the Commission is directed to 
impose a sanction only if it finds such action will be in the public interest. Since no 
two cases present the same circumstances, it is difficult to generalize as to when the 
public interest requires imposition of a sanction. However, the requirement does vest 
in the Commission broad discretion which may be exercised against imposing sanctions 
if the fraudulent conduct found is such that the violator was not aware of his duty. 
See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 20, at 1323-26. 
59 See cases cited notes 47, 50 supra and accompanying text. 
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lent conduct in certain circumstances, the variety and subtlety of potential 
abuses inherent in the sale of securities would make legislation or regula-
tion impractical. It is thus incumbent upon the Commission to provide 
more definitive guidelines as to when reliance by the salesman is no defense 
and, conversely, when such reliance is reasonable. At present, the courts 
and the Commission itself are not imposing upon the duty to investigate 
the limitations suggested by the Berko case itself. 
Willoughby C. Johnson 
